<mods:mods version="3.3" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-3.xsd" xmlns:mods="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><mods:titleInfo><mods:title>Experimental Exploration of Institutional Transition Options for Sustainable Management of Common Watershed Infrastructure in India</mods:title></mods:titleInfo><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart type="given">T</mods:namePart><mods:namePart type="family">Falk</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart type="given">K</mods:namePart><mods:namePart type="family">Shalander</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart type="given">S</mods:namePart><mods:namePart type="family">Srigiri</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:abstract>In the context of India, water is historically stored on the surface in small reservoirs&#13;
which also recharge shallow groundwater aquifers. There is a strong evidence that such&#13;
structures have the potential to achieve a wide range of societal goals. Nevertheless, despite&#13;
its obvious potentials, many communities fail to manage structures sustainably. In the&#13;
context of watershed projects the water infrastructure works well as long as there is external&#13;
facilitation but cooperation in maintenance often breaks down as soon as projects come to&#13;
an end.This experimental study helps to better understand cooperation patterns in Rajasthan&#13;
communities using and managing small village reservoirs. In addition, this study is intended&#13;
to create awareness amongst farmers for the cooperation challenge and encourage&#13;
discussions related to it. Experimental approaches have the potential to facilitate dialogue,&#13;
shared learning, collective decision making, and strengthening the adaptive management&#13;
capacity of local communities. We played framed public good experiments with 300 community &#13;
leaders and other local stakeholders. We introduced communication and social information &#13;
in terms of revealing the players’ decisions. The discussion was a critical element of our &#13;
game as it allowed the players to start negotiations and propose rules. We further introduced &#13;
institutional mechanisms as additional treatments. Our results suggest that participants were &#13;
able to generate solutions that are substantially better than the predictions of standard &#13;
economic theory even under private decision making without communication. Introducing information &#13;
and revealing the individual behaviour increases investments significantly. Players who agree to &#13;
rules but also those who propose a punishment invest higher amounts. Introducing the opportunity &#13;
to sanction fellow players also increased investments even though those who were punished reduced their&#13;
contributions. The discussions showed that the players connected the game to their real life experiences.&#13;
They highlighted challenges but gave also examples where cooperation in the community is working well. &#13;
The game sessions were a revelation for the community that led to a learning process.</mods:abstract><mods:classification authority="lcc">Watershed Management</mods:classification><mods:classification authority="lcc">Water Resources</mods:classification><mods:classification authority="lcc">Indian Agriculture</mods:classification><mods:originInfo><mods:dateIssued encoding="iso8061">2017-09</mods:dateIssued></mods:originInfo><mods:genre>Conference or Workshop Item</mods:genre></mods:mods>